In early 2026, new allegations about a covert €55 million funding pipeline between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and France’s far‑right Rassemblement National (RN) have raised urgent questions about foreign influence, opaque financing, and the resilience of French democratic safeguards. The controversy centres on claims that, beginning in 2025, informal Emirati channels allegedly bypassed French oversight mechanisms to sustain a party that now sits at the heart of both French and European politics, with around 30 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in Brussels and more than 120 deputies in the National Assembly. Given RN’s growing control over key committees related to foreign affairs, finance, and security, the prospect of undisclosed foreign money is not just a legal or ethical concern—it is a direct challenge to the integrity of French and European democracy.
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Report: Foreign Cash and French Politics: The Rassemblement National Question
RN’s ascent: from fringe Front National to central pillar of the right
To understand why the alleged €55 million network is so destabilising, it is essential to trace RN’s evolution from the old Front National to its current status as a dominant far‑right force. Under Marine Le Pen, the party deliberately rebranded from Front National to Rassemblement National in 2018, attempting to soften its image while maintaining a hard line on immigration, security, and national identity. This rebranding coincided with a gradual normalisation of the party in public debate and a steady climb in electoral results, culminating in historic gains in the 2022 legislative elections and subsequent contests that made RN the largest recipient of public funding in 2025, with close to €45 million in state support.
Le Pen’s political project has consistently centred on a strongly anti‑immigration, anti‑Islamist platform, targeting not only violent extremism but also political Islam, migration flows, and visible Islamic practices in public life. In this context, RN has repeatedly portrayed itself as the bulwark against what it calls “Islamist separatism,” aligning its rhetoric with broader trends in parts of Europe that seek to securitise Muslim communities. This ideological framing paved the way for convergences with Gulf states such as the UAE, which has made opposition to political Islam and movements linked to the Muslim Brotherhood a central pillar of its regional strategy.
By the time Jordan Bardella formally took over the party leadership in 2021, RN had tightened its internal discipline and focused on making itself a credible governing force. Bardella’s youth, media savvy, and aggressive positioning on law‑and‑order and identity issues helped consolidate RN’s appeal to both traditional working‑class voters and segments of the lower middle class feeling squeezed by economic hardship and cultural anxieties.
The result was an unprecedented level of institutional presence: dozens of MEPs in the European Parliament and a large parliamentary group in the National Assembly, with deputies able to exert real leverage on legislative agendas and committee work.
A history of financial fragility and foreign‑linked lifelines
RN’s current political strength stands in stark contrast with its long‑running financial fragility. For over a decade, the party has struggled to secure credit from mainstream French banks, forcing it to rely on foreign lenders and unconventional arrangements. Investigations by French and European authorities have repeatedly highlighted irregular practices, culminating in court rulings that confirmed the embezzlement of European Parliament funds through fictitious parliamentary assistants linked to the party.
One of the most revealing episodes came after the 2017 presidential and legislative elections, when the party—then still closely associated with the Front National label—faced serious financial difficulties. An 8‑million‑euro loan, channelled via a bank in the United Arab Emirates on behalf of a French businessman, effectively saved Marine Le Pen’s organisation by ensuring its campaign accounts were not declared in deficit.
Reporting shows that this loan, backed by expected state reimbursement of campaign expenditure, was structured at a high interest rate and arranged after the party had been unable to secure sufficient financing through other routes. While the funds ultimately originated from a private actor with ties to Africa rather than directly from an Emirati institution, the use of a UAE‑based bank and the broader regional networking underscored how dependent RN had become on foreign‑linked financial lifelines.
Recent years have only deepened scrutiny of RN’s money flows. In July 2025, French police raided the party’s headquarters as part of a judicial investigation into suspected illegal financing and possible money‑laundering connected to campaign loans granted by wealthy party members and associates between 2020 and 2024.
Investigators focused on so‑called “habitual loans” used during regional, presidential, legislative, and European campaigns, examining hundreds of contracts and internal documents. While these raids did not publicly establish any Emirati connection, they confirmed that RN’s finances are heavily reliant on opaque, often personalised arrangements rather than transparent, institutional credit.
Against this backdrop, the emergence of new allegations about a far larger, ostensibly informal, €55 million funding structure tied to UAE networks taps directly into existing concerns: a party already sanctioned over misuse of European funds, already saved once by a loan routed via a UAE bank, and already under investigation for unconventional financing practices.
Allegations and emerging patterns of influence
The latest claims—circulating in activist circles, media investigations, and parliamentary gossip—suggest that in 2025 RN leaders and intermediaries cultivated a set of informal funding channels linked to Emirati actors, possibly totalling around €55 million in value over several years. These allegations cannot currently be independently verified and, crucially, no official records have surfaced that show direct payments from UAE state entities to RN politicians or party structures. Still, they point to a pattern of contact, access, and converging political narratives that merits close scrutiny.
According to these accounts, Jordan Bardella is said to have undertaken discreet visits to Abu Dhabi in June 2025, where he reportedly met with senior Emirati figures including Foreign Minister Abdallah bin Zayed, Mubadala CEO Khaldoon Al Mubarak, and UAE special envoy Lana Nusseibeh. These encounters, allegedly coordinated with the help of veteran RN MEP Thierry Mariani—who has long cultivated networks in Moscow, Damascus, and Gulf capitals—are described as part political networking, part fundraising roadshow.
While private meetings between political leaders and foreign officials are not in themselves unusual, the claims suggest that assurances of long‑term political alignment on issues such as political Islam, Iran policy, and Mediterranean security were paired with discussions about practical support for RN’s growing electoral machine.
A further piece of this narrative involves a 2026 meeting in Paris between RN interlocutors and UAE ambassador Fahad Saeed Al Raqbani, portrayed as a follow‑up to the 2025 Abu Dhabi contacts. Again, there is no publicly available documentary evidence that such meetings resulted in illicit transfers of funds or explicit quid‑pro‑quos.
What is documented, however, is a broader pattern of RN’s openness to foreign‑linked funding mechanisms, the party’s earlier exploration of Emirati financial channels in the mid‑2010s, and the consistent overlap between its anti‑Islamist rhetoric and the UAE’s regional messaging.
Judicial raids in 2025, ongoing financial investigations, insider testimony cited anonymously in various media, and European Parliament records regarding travel, lobbying activities, and committee interventions collectively contribute to a picture of a party that operates at the edge of legal oversight, exploiting gaps and grey zones rather than directly flouting the law in ways that leave a clear paper trail.
In this context, the absence of formal records confirming direct UAE funding does not invalidate the concern; instead, it underscores how influence can be exerted through complex, multi‑layered structures—intermediary business figures, “friendly” foundations, consultancy contracts, speaking fees, or campaign‑adjacent entities—rather than a simple wire transfer from a foreign ministry to a party treasurer.
Political narrative: “fighting Islamism” as a bridge
RN’s political narrative provides a crucial bridge between allegations of foreign funding and questions of ideological alignment. For years, Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella have framed the party’s domestic agenda in terms of a battle against “Islamist extremism,” often blurring the lines between violent jihadist groups, non‑violent political Islam, and ordinary Muslim communities. This framing aligns closely with the UAE’s own posture, which aggressively targets movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, labels a wide array of Islamic organisations as extremist, and backs regional actors who share this hostility.
In France and Europe, RN’s MEPs and deputies use this narrative to push for tighter migration controls, expansive surveillance powers, restrictions on Islamic symbols, and more permissive security cooperation with authoritarian allies in the Middle East. Within the European Parliament, RN’s sizeable delegation positions itself in committees and delegations where questions of counter‑terrorism, external relations, and human rights are debated, giving it access to information and influence in shaping resolutions and political group positions.
If RN is simultaneously the beneficiary—directly or indirectly—of foreign financial support from a state that shares and actively promotes this ideological line, then what appears as a purely domestic policy stance starts to look like part of a transnational political project.
This is where the risk to national sovereignty becomes particularly acute. A party that claims to defend French autonomy and identity may, in practice, be advancing the strategic preferences of a foreign state whose priorities in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the broader Islamic world do not necessarily align with France’s long‑term interests.
Moreover, because RN’s narrative is rooted in cultural and security anxieties, rather than granular policy detail, it can be a powerful vehicle for normalising far‑reaching legal and institutional changes that gradually erode civil liberties and pluralism.
Democratic risks: opacity, leverage, and institutional capture
The alleged €55 million Emirati connection magnifies structural vulnerabilities already visible in France’s and Europe’s political systems. First, opaque foreign funding undermines democratic accountability by allowing external actors to shape electoral competition without public scrutiny or consent. French rules on party financing and foreign contributions are designed to prevent this, but creative intermediaries—private businessmen, offshore vehicles, or banks in friendly jurisdictions—can blur the lines.
Second, financial dependence creates leverage. A party reliant on external support to sustain its campaigns, staff, and media infrastructure may feel compelled to align its positions with the preferences of its patrons, whether on EU votes, arms deals, sanctions policy, or diplomatic initiatives. In the RN case, this could translate into specific stances on Middle Eastern conflicts, defence contracts, or EU‑Gulf cooperation that are less the product of French deliberation and more the result of foreign strategic calculus.
Third, institutional capture becomes a real possibility as RN’s parliamentary presence expands. With over 120 deputies and some 30 MEPs, the party’s representatives can seek positions on committees overseeing foreign affairs, defence, intelligence oversight, financial regulation, and EU external action. Even without ministerial portfolios, they can influence hearings, shape reports, and introduce amendments that reflect external interests. If such activity is underwritten by undeclared foreign funding, then democratic institutions risk being turned into conduits for foreign policy agendas crafted elsewhere.
What must happen next: audits, transparency, and stronger ethics rules
Given the stakes, the response cannot be limited to media exposés or partisan point‑scoring. A credible defence of French and European democracy requires structural reforms and concrete investigative steps.
First, there is a strong case for initiating forensic audits of RN’s accounts, including affiliated micro‑parties, campaign structures, and third‑party associations that handle fundraising, consultancy, or communications. Such audits should examine not only formal loans and donations but also service contracts, consultancy agreements, and flows linked to entities registered abroad or operating through financial centres associated with the UAE and other Gulf states.
Second, French law‑makers and regulators should move toward mandatory, detailed disclosure of foreign contacts by party leaders, parliamentary group chairs, and key campaign officials. This would cover meetings with foreign state representatives, state‑linked investment funds, and lobbyists acting on behalf of foreign governments or sovereign entities. When a party that frames itself as a defender of sovereignty engages extensively with foreign power brokers, citizens have a right to know the extent and content of those relationships.
Third, ethics oversight in both Brussels and Paris must be reinforced. In the European Parliament, existing rules on transparency, revolving doors, and side activities do not adequately capture the complexity of modern influence networks, which can include think tank funding, media partnerships, and informal advisory roles. Strengthening investigative capacities—possibly through an independent ethics body with investigative powers—would help detect patterns of coordinated influence that cross national borders and party lines.
Finally, this controversy should be understood not as an isolated “€55 million RN scandal” but as part of a broader wave of foreign influence operations targeting European democracies. Whether the actors are in Moscow, Abu Dhabi, Doha, or Beijing, the underlying logic is similar: identify rising forces on the political spectrum, build ideological or transactional links, and quietly invest in their ascent in the hope of securing long‑term leverage over policy. For France, allowing such dynamics to unfold unchecked would mean ceding a portion of its democratic sovereignty to the highest bidder.
The allegations about Rassemblement National UAE funding may yet be clarified, disproven, or substantiated through future investigations. For now, the absence of confirmed documentary proof of a direct Emirati cash pipeline must not obscure the very real dangers posed by opaque foreign influence and the structural weaknesses of current oversight regimes. France and the European Union still have the tools to defend the integrity of their political systems—but only if they act decisively, transparently, and with the clear understanding that democracy cannot remain for sale.
