In 2012, the European Union was rocked by the “Snus-Gate” scandal, a high-profile case that exposed critical flaws in EU anti-corruption procedures and the pervasive influence of lobbying on regulatory outcomes. At the heart of the controversy was the resignation of EU Health Commissioner John Dalli, following allegations of bribery attempts related to the proposed EU ban on snus, a smokeless tobacco product. The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) led the investigation, but its conduct and the subsequent regulatory failures revealed deep structural weaknesses in EU institutions’ ability to resist undue influence and ensure transparency.
OLAF’s Investigation: Procedural Shortcomings
OLAF’s investigation into the Snus-Gate scandal began after Swedish Match, a major snus manufacturer, accused Maltese businessman Silvio Zammit of attempting to solicit €60 million in exchange for lifting the EU ban on snus sales. OLAF’s findings concluded there was “a number of unambiguous and converging circumstantial evidences” that Dalli was aware of the bribery attempt but failed to act. However, the investigation was widely criticized for lacking direct evidence and for procedural irregularities. Corporate Europe Observatory, an independent watchdog, noted that OLAF selectively compiled arguments and did not properly assess the credibility of witnesses, raising concerns about the integrity of its investigative process.
OLAF’s own Supervisory Committee later concluded that the agency had violated its mandate and broken EU rules during the investigation. The European Ombudsman also found that the Commission’s approach to publicizing meetings with tobacco lobbyists was inadequate, highlighting a broader failure to enforce transparency rules across EU institutions. These findings suggest that OLAF’s investigation, while intended to uphold EU anti-corruption standards, fell short in both rigor and adherence to procedural safeguards.
Regulatory Failures and the Influence of Lobbying
The Snus-Gate scandal underscored the risks posed by the tobacco industry’s persistent lobbying efforts within EU institutions. Despite the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which obliges signatories to protect public health policy from tobacco industry interests, Dalli held undisclosed meetings with tobacco lobbyists, and senior Commission officials engaged in multiple undisclosed meetings with tobacco representatives. These actions were not only a breach of FCTC guidelines but also reflected a broader culture of opacity and susceptibility to corporate influence.
The EU’s Transparency Register, which tracks lobbyists and their activities, was also found to be insufficient in ensuring accountability. Swedish Match, despite being a registered lobbyist, failed to disclose its relationship with Gayle Kimberley, a lawyer who secretly represented the company in meetings with Dalli. Such lapses in transparency enabled the tobacco industry to manipulate the regulatory process and perpetuate misinformation about the events surrounding Snus-Gate.
The Broader Context: Anti-Corruption and Lobbying Transparency
The Snus-Gate scandal is emblematic of wider challenges facing EU institutions in combating corruption and ensuring lobbying transparency. According to OECD standards, preventing corruption requires not only robust laws and codes of conduct but also effective enforcement mechanisms and a culture of integrity. The EU’s anti-corruption strategy, including OLAF and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), has made progress in identifying and addressing corruption, but the Snus-Gate case revealed significant gaps in implementation and oversight.
Transparency remains a critical issue. Over 12,000 organizations are registered in the EU’s Transparency Register, but many Member States lack mandatory lobbying regulations, relying instead on voluntary or self-regulatory systems. This patchwork approach undermines the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures and allows for continued industry interference in policy-making.
Global and Health Implications
Tobacco industry interference is not unique to the EU. The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) calls on governments to protect public health policies from tobacco industry influence, but global data show that interference remains widespread. According to the Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index, 43 countries have seen a worsening trend in industry interference, highlighting the need for stronger international standards and enforcement.
The Snus-Gate scandal also had a direct impact on EU health policy. While the tobacco industry’s lobbying efforts to lift the snus ban ultimately failed, the controversy exposed vulnerabilities in the regulatory process and led to heightened scrutiny of tobacco industry influence. The rapid adoption of the revised Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) following Dalli’s resignation demonstrated the potential for public pressure and transparency to drive positive change, but also underscored the fragility of these gains in the face of ongoing industry lobbying.
The OLAF investigation into the Snus-Gate scandal revealed critical shortcomings in EU anti-corruption procedures and the persistent influence of lobbying on regulatory outcomes. While the EU has made strides in combating corruption and improving transparency, the Snus-Gate case highlighted the need for stronger enforcement mechanisms, greater accountability, and a culture of integrity across EU institutions. As global health challenges continue to evolve, the lessons of Snus-Gate remain relevant for policymakers and watchdogs committed to safeguarding public interest against corporate influence.
