The European People’s Party (EPP) is at the centre of criticism over how the European Parliament handled its latest Sudan war resolution, above all in relation to references to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). As the largest group in the chamber, its negotiating line and voting choices were decisive in shaping what Parliament ultimately said – and did not say – about alleged external support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The controversy is not about whether the EPP condemned atrocities in Sudan – it did – but about how far it was willing to go in naming specific states and linking EU policy to those concerns.
EPP’s role in removing references to the UAE
Drafts and public comments from other political families indicate that earlier versions of the Sudan war resolution contained more explicit language on the UAE, or at least on networks said to be operating “from or through” Emirati territory in support of the RSF. Socialists & Democrats (S&D), among others, pushed amendments that aimed to:
- Name the UAE in connection with alleged support to the RSF.
- Call for suspension or re‑evaluation of EU–UAE trade negotiations for as long as such support was believed to be continuing.
Those attempts did not succeed. The text adopted by Parliament makes no mention of the UAE and instead uses broad formulations such as “external actors” or “external interference” to describe outside involvement in the conflict.
Accounts from the negotiations suggest that this outcome reflected a political choice: the EPP, working with right‑leaning groups, opposed the more explicit wording proposed by S&D and others, and its preference for general language largely set the upper limit for how far the resolution would go on this point.
Alignment with right‑leaning groups and impact on the text
Several reports describe the EPP joining forces with the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and other right‑wing members to vote down amendments directly targeting the UAE. After the vote, S&D and left‑of‑centre MEPs publicly complained that the EPP had “teamed up with the far right” to dilute the resolution, arguing that this alliance was the reason explicit references to the UAE disappeared.
That is a political characterisation, but it sits on a clear factual basis: the majority that removed or blocked references to the UAE was made up of centre‑right and right‑wing groups, while progressive groups tended to back stronger wording.
This alignment had concrete consequences:
- The resolution criticises atrocities in Sudan and calls for accountability but does so without naming one of the states that NGOs, analysts and Sudanese actors have frequently accused of supplying arms or facilitating finance to the RSF.
- Proposals to link EU–UAE trade policy to those concerns – for example, by pausing negotiations – did not survive the final round of edits.
Critics argue that this has weakened the Parliament’s leverage. Supporters of the EPP line counter that explicit naming would have risked fracturing consensus and that the priority was to pass a strong humanitarian message. The dispute is therefore less about whether to condemn the war and more about how directly to address alleged external enablers.
UAE lobbying and timing of the vote
The negotiations occurred against the backdrop of a visible lobbying effort by the UAE. In the days before the vote, Emirati Minister of State Lana Nusseibeh travelled to Strasbourg and met senior Parliament figures and group representatives, including those involved in the resolution talks. Her visit was presented by the UAE as part of a diplomatic push to highlight its role in mediation and humanitarian support rather than in fuelling the conflict.
Shortly after the vote, the UAE issued an official statement welcoming the resolution. Abu Dhabi underscored in particular that Parliament had endorsed the “Quad” diplomatic format – a framework in which the UAE is a key player – and did not acknowledge any criticism of its own conduct, because none was included in the text.
For many observers, this reaction reinforced the impression that the final wording was seen in Abu Dhabi as favourable: explicit references that might have linked the UAE to arms or finance allegations had been removed in the drafting phase.
There is no public evidence that the EPP altered its position as a direct result of this lobbying. However, the sequence – intensive outreach by a state actor, followed by the disappearance of references that would have named that state – has naturally become a focus for political and journalistic questions about how diplomatic and strategic factors may have influenced the group’s negotiating red lines.
Why the EPP may have been cautious
EPP figures have not publicly framed themselves as defenders of the UAE in the Sudan context. When they justify the final language, they typically refer to the need for consensus across groups, avoiding what they describe as “politicisation,” and focusing on broad humanitarian priorities.
At the same time, there are clear structural reasons why major European parties, including the EPP, might hesitate to endorse language that directly targets the UAE:
- The UAE is an important trade and investment partner for the EU, with expanding economic links and an active discussion about deepening trade and investment frameworks.
- Several EU governments see the UAE as a useful regional interlocutor or mediator, particularly on energy and security, in an unstable neighbourhood.
A resolution that directly accused the UAE of enabling a party to the conflict in Sudan could therefore be perceived as politically sensitive, potentially complicating broader EU–UAE relations. Against that background, the EPP’s insistence on general terms can be read as part of a cautious, relationship‑management approach that gives significant weight to diplomatic and economic considerations alongside human‑rights concerns.
Criticism from other groups and civil society
The outcome has been sharply criticised by other groups and by parts of civil society. Their main arguments are:
- That failing to name the UAE undermines the credibility of Parliament’s stance, given the amount of reporting and analysis pointing to alleged Emirati involvement in the conflict.
- That not addressing external enabling networks more directly weakens pressure on the supply chains and financial routes that shape the RSF’s capacity to wage war.
- That this reinforces perceptions of double standards in EU foreign policy, with tough language applied to adversaries and more cautious language when powerful strategic partners are involved.
These criticisms often single out the EPP, not because it acted alone, but because as the largest group it had the political weight either to allow stronger language through or to block it – and opted for the latter. The group’s internal discussions are not public, so outside observers cannot fully reconstruct its reasoning.
What is evident in the final text and voting record, however, is that the EPP’s stance was pivotal in ensuring that the “Sudan War Resolution” went forward without mentioning the UAE by name.
